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TULSA REPARATIONS: THE SURVIVORS' 
STORY 
CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR. * 
Abstract: This Article explores the ability of reparations litigation to 
transform the American debate about race by promoting "interest conver-
gence" between reparations advocates and the majority population. As 
Professor Derrick Bell has argued, only when the interests of the majority 
converge with those of the minority will the minority achieve its goals. 
Reparations lawsuits-especially those framed as traditional civil rights 
claims. as in the ongoing litigation seeking reparations for the 1921 Tulsa 
Race Riot-can begin to promote the convergence of interests between 
reparationists and the reluctant majority population by forcing the major-
ity population to confront past and present injustices against African 
Americans. The Article concludes that litigative reparations are a prom-
ising first step toward insuring justice for those who were sacrificed 
during slavery and Jim Crow oppression. 
INTRODUCTION 
Reparations advocacy has dominated the news as of late. While 
many dismissed reparationists in the past as members of a narrow and 
ideologically driven fringe movement, reparations today is discussed 
and debated in the New Yorh Times, the Wall Street Journal, many news 
programs, and even in popular culture.1 The comedian Chris Rock 
has introduced it as part of his routine, and the recent controversial 
and commercially successful comedy, Barbershop, included a lengthy 
* Jesse Climenko Professor of Law and Vice Dean for the Clinical Programs, HafYard 
Law School. This essay results from a lecture giyen by the author at the reparations confer-
ence hosted by the Bost01l College Third lIiJrld LawJournalon ~farch 14, 2003. 
I Sec Dalton Conley, Op-Ed, The Cost of SlaTler)', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2003, at Al (pro-
posing a net-worth-based solution for reparations and generating several subsequent let-
ters to the editor); Allen Guelzo, Reason ill Disrcpail; WALL ST. j., Nov. 22, 2002, available at 
2002 WL-WSJ 103126916 (criticizing a conference at Columbia University on reparations 
and the law); Gary L. Schell, Letter to the Editor, Slain Union Soldiers Paid 'Blood Costs'for 
Slavery, WALL ST.]., Dec. 3, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 103127610 (responding to Rea-
son in Disrepair by suggesting the liYes sacrificed by Union Soldiers during the Ciyil War are 
ignored by reparations adyocates); sources cited illfm note 2. 
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dialogue about the movement.2 Nevertheless, despite the growing in-
terest in reparations by supporters and opponents, it would be a mis-
take to view reparations advocacy as a popularity contest. Reparations 
advocates are deeply committed to the goal of reparations for de-
scendants of African slaves, and do not believe that popular accep-
tance of the effort can or should drive the movement. 
Indeed, reparationists do not seek the endorsement of the major-
ity of the American population or even the majority of the African-
American population for what we do. We do not seek your vote, your 
support, or even your encouragement when engaging in this type of 
advocacy because the motivations that sustain us come not from pub-
lic accolades but from empathy with our clients-those who survived 
the violence of slavery and segregation and those who did not. One of 
the fundamental goals of reparations for African Americans is to in-
sure that those who were sacrificed are not forgotten in our rush to 
move beyond the painful lessons of our past. 3 
But reparations is more than an exercise in education and re-
membrance. Reparations advocates ultimately seek the redistribution 
of resources from one group to another. To that extent, reparations is 
another manifestation of the progressive agenda articulated by Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson and his vision of addressing the needs of the 
"Great Society."4 Reparations is, in other words, yet another expres-
sion of the demand for political, social, and economic equality that, 
since the failure of the Civil Rights movement in the 1970s, has been 
stifled and suppressed in this country. 
Reparations is controversial and distinctive, however, because 
race is one of the criteria justifYing the redistribution: those who are 
to pay should do so because they injured a racially identifiable group 
of people. In fact, the link between race and injury is closer than this; 
those who inflicted the injury did so using race as perhaps one of 
2 A.BC News 20/20: .1melica's IOU (ABC television broadcast, l\far. 23, 2001) (induding 
clips of Chris Rock asking strangers on the streets of New 'tbrk for their opinions on repa-
rations for slavery as part of his show); BARBERSHOP (I\IGI\I Pictures 2002). 
3 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Reparations for the Children of Slaves: Litigating the Issues, 33 
U. MEl\1. L. REV. 245, 245-47 (2003) (discussing motivation for reparations as representa-
tion of those who worked and died as a result of slavery). 
4 I have made the connection between PresidentJohnson and reparations in Charles]. 
Ogletree, Jr., Repailing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in A.merica, 38 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 317-18 (2003) [hereinafter Ogletree, Repailing the Past). 
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many justifications.5 Demanding payment from whites on the basis of 
their government's or their ancestors' racism results in a relatively 
predictable and forceful denial of liability for restitution to the victims 
of those injuries. 
This overwhelmingly negative response poses a problem for repa-
rations advocates: While legal battles may be fought and won without 
widespread social approval of the litigation's goals, the type of social 
change pursued through reparations advocacy would seem to require 
sacrifices from, and perhaps the approval of, that segment of the popu-
lation most adamantly opposed to reparations. 't\'hether or not one be-
lieves that the current allocation of resources depends upon the ille-
gitimate exploitation of African Americans,6 those who have the 
resources will lose some of them should they be redistributed along the 
lines suggested by reparations advocates. 
The problem faced by reparations advocates is a familiar one for 
civil rights advocates, and has been described under the rubric of "in-
terest convergence" by Professor Derrick BelI.7 As Bell argues, only 
when the in terests of the majority converge with those of the minority 
will the minority achieve its goals. Only: 
[w] hen whites perceive that it will be profitable or at least 
cost-free to serve, hire, admit, or otherwise deal with blacks on 
a nondiscriminatory basis, they do so. ~'hen they fear-accu-
rately or not-that there may be a loss, incOlwenience, or up-
set to themselves or other whites, discriminatory conduct usu-
ally follows.s 
In an earlier article on reparations, Bell suggested that the type of in-
terest convergence necessary to support reparations was a long way off.9 
5 Sec, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing "mixed mo-
tive" discrimination); sec also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003) (clarifYing 
the evidentiarv standard to be applied ill mixed motive cases). 
6 And so allY redistribution of resources along the lilies suggested by reparations advo-
cates is justified, and the con tinuing failure to redistribute is wrongful. 
7 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest COl/vcrgence Dilemma, 
in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: TIn: KEy WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE ]\[OVEMENT 20, 22 
(Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Bell, Interest Convergencel. 
8 DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 7 
(1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF TIlE WELLl. 
9 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Dissection of a Dream, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 156, 157 (1974) 
(reviewing BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973». 
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A recent study confirms that this is still the case.10 vVhat are the pros-
pects for changing these attitudes, and how can it be done? 
This symposium is one sign of hope. It is wonderful to witness the 
diverse range of scholars who are here to comment on the reparations 
movement, if the ad hoc and fragmented set of groups pursuing repa-
rations can be called a movement. But movement there is-through 
the courtsll and in the legislatures of various states12 and cities13 around 
the country. The momentous nature of much of the currently filed liti-
gation renders all the more urgent scholarly contributions to the de-
velopment of reparations doctrine and policy. This forum is timely in 
that it comes on the heels of an important effort to address reparations 
in the court system, most recently seen in a lawsuit seeking reparations, 
Alexander v. Governor of Oklahoma,14 filed in the Northern District of 
Oklahoma. So it is particularly enjoyable to participate in this sympo-
sium having just filed that suit, and to receive predominantly positive 
feedback from the participan ts on its merits. 
My goal in this Article is to suggest that reparations litigation can 
provide a means of transforming the debate about race in such a man-
ner that the mcyority resistance to racial justice can be abated. One way 
in which to do so is to demonstrate the COllYergence of interests be-
tween the advocates of reparations and the mcyority population. As Pro-
fessor Ewart Guinier recognized in another early reparations article, 
reparations is likely to help whites as well as African Americans because 
"the cure for difficulties in correcting institutionally-imposed inequity is 
more correcting of inequity. In short, legislation for reparations could 
be generalized to erase societal disadvantages suffered by whites as well 
10 See Harbour Fraser Hodder, Riven by Reparations: The Price of Slavery, HARV. l\IAG., 
May/June 2003, at 12,13. 
11 See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBos-
ton Fin. Corp. (E.D.N.\: filed Mar. 26, 2002) (No.02-CV-1862). 
12 See, e.g., Slavery Era Insl11'ance Policies Act, CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13810-13813 (West 
Supp. 2003); Act of May 4, 1994, 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Servo ch. 94-359 (West) (relating to 
Rosewood, Florida) (codified in part at FLA. STAT. ch.l004.60, 1009.55 (2003»; 1921 
Tulsa Race Riot Reconciliation Act of 2001, Okla. Sess. Law Servo ch. 315 (West) (codified 
at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8000.1 (3) (2002». 
13 See, e.g.,John M. Broder, The Business of Slavery & Penitence, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,2003, 
§ 4, at 4 (discussing Los Angeles City Council's unanimous approval of "an ordinance ... 
that would require any company wishing to do business with Los Allgeles to illvestigate and 
disclose any profits derived from the American slave trade"); Sabrina L. Miller & Gary 
Washburn, New Chicago Law Requires Firms to Tell Slavery Links, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 2002, § 2, 
at 1 (discussing Chicago Ordinance). 
H Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, Alexander V. Governor of Oklahoma (N.D. 
Okla. filed Feb. 28, 2003) (No.03-CV-133). 
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as blacks.''15 In this way, reparations litigation can provide the kind of 
interest convergence that is necessary to overcome the challenges fac-
ing reparations advocates. 
I. THE REPARATIONS EFFORT IN GREENWOOD, OKLAHOMA 
On the night of May 31 through June 1, 1921, a mob of white riot-
ers, including individuals deputized by the Chief of Police of the city of 
Tulsa and properly activated members of the Oklahoma State National 
Guard, descended upon Greenwood, the African-American district of 
Tulsa popularly known as the "black Wall Street. "16 Within twelve hours, 
over eight thousand African Americans had been forced to flee their 
homesP Some kept running, relocating in different towns within 
Oklahoma. IS Otis Clark, who was eighteen at the time, fled all the way 
to California, refusing to return until well into his nineties. 
After the mob had done its work, as many as 300 African Ameri-
cans had been murdered and over 1,200 residences had been burned 
to the ground in a forty acre stretch of land.19 The Riot caused more 
than $20 million (in today's dollars) worth of property damage.2o 
Those who stayed were rounded up and herded into detention 
camps, later to spend the winter like refugees in tents provided by the 
Red Cross.21 Fifteen days after the Riot, Judge Loyal]. Martin, chair of 
the Emergency Committee appointed to restore order after the Riot, 
acknowledged that: 
Tulsa can only redeem herself from the country-wide shame 
and humiliation into which she is today plunged by com-
plete restitution and rehabilitation of the black belt. The rest 
15 Ewart Guinier, Book Review, 82 YALE LJ. 1719, 1723 (1973) (reviewing BORIS I. 
BITTKER, supra note 9). 
16 See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint '1 2, 17, Alexander (No. 03-CV-133); Don 
Ross, Prologue to TULSA RACE RIOT: A REPORT BY THE OKLAHOMA COMMISSION TO STUDY 
THE TuLSA RACE RIOT OF 1921, at ix, xi (2001) [hereinafter TuLSA RACE RIOT], available at 
http://www.ok-history.mus.ok.us/trrc/freport.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2003). 
17 See Alfred L. Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland: Contemplating Civil Right~ Ac-
tions and Reparations for the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921, at 3 (2000) (preliminary draft of 
report to Tulsa Race Riot Commission) [hereinafter Brophy, Preliminary Report] (un pub-
li~hed, available online at http://www.law.ua.edu/staff/bio/abrophy/abrophy_links.html 
(last visited Nov. 12.2003». 
18 Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint '1~ 5,9, Alexander (No. 03-CV-133). 
19 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8000.1 (3) (2002);John Hope Franklin & Scott Ellsworth, 
History Knows No Fences: An Overview, in TuLSA RACE RIOT, supra note 16, at 21,22-23. 
20 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8000.1 (3). 
21 Scott Ellsworth, The Tulsa Race Riot, in TuLSA RACE RIOT, supra note 16, at 37,88. 
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of the United States must know that the real citizenship of 
Tulsa ... will make good the damage, so far as it can be 
done, to the last penny.22 
Eighty years later, the commission created by the state to determine the 
causes of the Riot and to assess culpability agreed that "[r ]eparations 
are the right thing to do. "23 Yet, as of today, neither the state of Okla-
homa nor the city of Tulsa has paid one cent to any of the victims or 
their descendants. 
There are over 120 survivors of the riots still living; for example, Otis 
Clark, who recently celebrated his one-hundredth birthday, is still alive 
and seeking justice.24 These survivors have come together as a group, 
along with the descendants of those who did not live long enough to see 
justice done and to have their experiences acknowledged and addressed 
directly by the municipal, state, and federal government. I am the lead 
attorney on the Oklahoma lawsuit, and two other contributors to this 
s}mposium are participating in the litigation. 25 
The Oklahoma lawsuit is a model of the transformative process of 
interest convergence between the advocates of reparations and the 
majority population.26 The suit is based upon the model of compensa-
tory damages that Professor Keith Hylton endorses in this sympo-
22 Tulsa, 112 NATION 833, 839 (1921), quoted in ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING 
THE DREAMLAND: THE TuLSA RIOT OF 1921, at 107 (2002) [hereinafter BROPHY, RECON-
STRUCTING THE DREAMLAND J. 
23 TULSA RACE RIOT, supra note 16, at 20. 
24 See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint n 66,557, Alexander (No. 03-CV-133). 
25 Professor Alfred L. Brophy, who wrote the seminal book on the Riot and its legal 
consequences, has been indefatigable in his efforts to ensure that the plaintiffs had their 
day in court. It is no understatement to say that this lawsuit could not have been filed 
without that fantastic resource. See genenilly BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND, 
supra note 22. Professor Brophy also served on the Oklahoma Commission to Study the 
Race Riot of 1921, and contributed a chapter to its report. See Alfred L. Brophy, Assessing 
State and City Culpability: The Riot and the Law, in TULSA RACE RIOT, supra note 16, at 163, 
163-83. He also wrote a more trenchant and as yet unpublished argument for reparations 
for the riot victims. See generally Brophy, Preliminary Report, supra note 17. Professor Eric J. 
Miller, Michele A. Roberts, Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Suzette M. Malveaux, Johnnie Cochran, 
Denis C. Sweet III, and several local Oklahoma attorneys, including Leslie Mansfield and 
James O. Goodwin, are among the individuals who assisted me in drafting the complaint in 
Ale;ICander, which is the suit brought on behalf of survivors of the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 
and descendants of the victims of that riot, suing the Governor of the state of Oklahoma, 
the city of Tulsa, the Chief of Police of the city of Tulsa, and the Tulsa Police Departmen t 
for damages and injunctive relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 
1983, and 1985, and for supplemental state-law claims. See Plaintiffs' First Amended Com-
plaint n 38,489,518-64, Alexander (No. 03-CV-133). 
26 See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supra note 8, at 7; Guinier, supra note 
15, at 1719, 1723. 
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shlm,27 and it is intended to serve as a paradigm by creating concrete 
cases with actual living victims and by identifying the fact of racial re-
pression as a present and continuing injustice. 
Professor Hylton's assessment of the validity of the social welfare 
model of reparations litigation deserves serious analysis.28 While the 
discussion of interest convergence may suggest that such cases have 
been filed prematurely, the "deliberate speed" of racial reform in this 
country, at least since the second opinion in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,29 has been a disappointment to many of those seeking racial jus-
tice. 30 We have hardly begun the task of changing the racial climate in 
America in the thirty-five years since the end of de jure segregation. 
We are approaching the 140th anniversary of the end of the Civil War 
and the passing of the Thirteenth Amendment, yet attitudes to race 
remain mired in animosity and distrust. If we have learned one thing, 
it is that this is not a problem that money alone can solve. It involves, 
as well, the consideration of new directions in our national project of 
racial reconciliation and a new beginning in the task of founding a 
new and fairer America. 
II. INTEREST CONVERGENCE AND THE ERADICATION OF RACISM 
Professor Bell's discussion of interest convergence can be under-
stood against the background of two different theories of racism in 
America. A moderately pessimistic theory has been propounded by 
Professor Roy Brooks, who suggests that it is "naive[] [to] expect[] that 
whites will act more nobly than Mrican Americans or any other group 
would act under similar circumstances" by looking beyond their self-
interests when confronted with a demand to redistribute social 
benefits.31 Professor Brooks's theory contends that, although integra-
tion has been a failure, that failure is limited and may be overcome by a 
strategy of limited separation.32 The theory contends that integration 
has failed and continues to fail many Mrican Americans,33 and that the 
27 See Keith N. Hylton, A Frallleworkfor Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 31, 
32-33 (2004). 
28 See id. 
29 349 V.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown If') . 
30 See id. at 30l. The first of the Brown opinions outlawed racial discrimination in pub-
lic education. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 V.S. 483,1495 (1954) ("Brownf'). 
31 Roy L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION? A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 
190 (1996). 
32 See id. at 104, 189-213. 
33 See id. at 190. 
20 Boston College Third Wodd Law journal [Vol. 24:13 
white community lacks a generalized will to overcome race-based social 
and economic disparities.34 Nonetheless, Professor Brooks clearly be-
lieves that racism can be overcome by strategies based on African-
American self-help.35 
Professor Bell's more pessimistic analysis suggests that racism is 
not merely an accidental by-product of American society or culture 
that can be undone by a sustained effort to eradicate it. Rather, Bell 
sees racism as endemic-a definitive, structural feature of liberal de-
mocracy in America.36 Far from a problematic but essentially transient 
social or psychological condition, racism is a permanent feature of 
American society, necessary for its stability and for the well-being of 
the m~ority of its citizens. 37 Thus, according to Bell: "Black people 
will never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean ef-
forts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary 
'peaks of progress,' short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as 
racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance. "38 
These two theories address the issue of redistributive racial goals 
(whether expressly or implicitly) from the perspective of interest con-
vergence. Brooks's discussion assumes that whites will not act against 
their interest, and so African-American self-help ought to be a m~or 
part of any strategy seeking to overcome racism. Bell's thesis is distin-
guishable from Brooks. Interest-convergence, he argues, explains how 
African Americans are able to achieve political gains despite the essen-
tially racist nature of American society. Political and social power is re-
tained by the white majority-in fact, true power is retained by a white 
min01ity that has power and wishes to conserve it, and the rest of white 
society is empowered only relative to African Americans.39 Thus, while 
not only African Americans, but a large portion of white society, are 
34 See id. at 105. Brooks's analysis replicates that of Professor Bell in his early article on 
interest convergence. See Bell, Interest Convergence, supra note 7, at 23-24. 
35 See BROOKS, supra note 31, at 256, 263-69, 284-85. 
36 See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM Of' THE WELL, supm note 8, at 10. Bell considers the 
relationship between racism and liberal democracy to be "svmbio[tic]," such that "'liberal 
democracy and racism in the United States are historically, even inherently, reinforcing; 
American society as we know it exists only because of its foundation in racially based slav-
ery, and it thrives only because racial discrimination continues.'" Id. (quoting JENNIFER 
HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA 5 (1984». 
37 See id. at 3-10. As evidence of the permanence of racism, Bell points to the "unstated 
understanding by the mass of whites that they will accept large disparities in economic 
opportunity in respect to other whites as long as they have a priority over blacks and other 
people of color for access to the few opportunities available." Id. at 10. 
38Id. at 12. 
39 See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supm note 8, at 8-9. 
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denied effective political, social, or economic power, the relative posi-
tion of African Americans to the rest of society serves to mask the dis-
enfranchisemen t of the majority of whites. 40 In terestcconvergence sug-
gests that, against this consolidation of power in an elite, redistributive 
gains are only possible when the interests of the elite and the rest coin-
cide. 
Accordingly, interest convergence works as a safety-valve, to per-
mit short-term gains for African Americans when doing so furthers 
the short- or long-term goals of the white elite. As a side effect, it has 
the important consequence of convincing the minority population 
(or others that lack power) that social change is possible, rather than 
ephemeral, and that participation in the social and political system 
will provide redistrilmtive benefits. This is an important check on 
widespread disaffection that may end in revolution. 
Reparations, understood in this light, can only be politically suc-
cessful to the extent that it can be presented as providing short- or 
long-term benefits for the empowered portion of the population. To 
the extent that reparations is predominantly, or only, a "black thing," 
it has little chance of succeeding. Thus, even with large-scale social 
backing, there can be no reparations unless those in power can see 
their interests converging with those who demand reparations. 
The potential of the reparations movement to persuade a white 
power elite that some form of social action is required may not be as 
fanciful as some have imagined. As respected historian Eric Foner 
noted recently, the mcyor problem with affirmative action is not the 
manner in which it is administered, but its separation from the other 
programs in troduced along with it in the 1960s.41 Public education 
continues to fail African Americans in significantly greater numbers 
than whites,42 and it is this failure that ensures the continuing rele-
vance of affirmative action as a stop-gap measure to help the unfortu-
nate succeed. 
As Bell notes, however, the move to integrated education-and 
indeed the whole Civil Rights revolution of the 1960s-can be re-
40 See id. at 7. 
41 See Eric Foner, Diversity ollerJllstice. NATION,July 14, 2003, at 4, 4. 
42 See, e.g., Neil]. Smelser et a!., Int1'Oduction to 1 AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS 
AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 1, 12-13 (Neil]. Smelser et a!. eds., 2001) (stating that research 
suggests that stereotypes lead teachers to expect less of black students than non-Hispanic 
whites, and this expectation leads to lower performance on test scores); James P. Smith, 
Race and Etll1licity in the Labor Alarket: Trends over the Short and Long Term, in 2 AMERICA BE-
COMING: RACL\L TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 52, 56 (Neil]. Smelser et a!. eds., 
2001) (stating that on ayerage, blacks complete fewer years of education than whites). 
22 Boston College Third H'£Jrld Law Joumal [Vol. 24:13 
garded as an effort by white America to head off the real possibility of 
race-based mass civil disobedience.43 Since the end of slavery, whites 
have resisted the challenge of integration and have found more or 
less sophisticated ways by which to resist the efforts of Mrican Ameri-
cans to participate on equal terms in American society.44 As in the 
1960s, the frustrations of second-class citizenship have led to the in-
evitable resurgence of black nationalism, as best demonstrated in the 
now broadly accepted, although controversial, momentum for repara-
tions. With the failure of a race-neutral liberalism to provide a popu-
list political alternative, reparations is, for many Mrican Americans, 
the only remaining option to seek the sort of redistribution of re-
sources promised under the "Great Society." White failure to embrace 
the modest civil rights or integration programs envisaged during the 
1970s and into the 1980s has allowed the black underclass to grasp the 
issue of reparations. As the situation currently stands, it looks like they 
will not let go until they receive justice. 
III. SLAVERY REPARATIONS AND REDISTRIBUTION 
Reparations is an attempt to obtain restitution for the wrongs 
inflicted through slavery and segregation and persisting through the 
current landscape of racial discrimination in America. At bottom, it is 
premised upon a principle of compensation: those who have inflicted 
an injury must compensate those who have suffered the injury in an 
amount appropriate to the wrong inflicted. As is well recognized, the 
problem with slavery reparations is that all of the victims are dead, as 
are the individuals who participated in and perpetrated slavery and its 
related institutions. Nevertheless, some of those institutions survive, 
among them a range of corporations, other private institutions such 
as universities and colleges, and state and federal governments. 
There are a number of obvious and well-detailed hurdles to seek-
ing reparations through litigation.45 Two principal barriers are the 
lack of living plaintiffs and the various statutes of limitations. These 
impediments militate against the traditional forms of recovery of tort 
law and quasi-contract. Furthermore, quite apart from the issue of 
"deep pockets," there are important symbolic factors at stake when 
43 See Bell, Interest Conve'rgence, supra note 7, at 23-24. 
44 See RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 85-86 (2000). 
45 See generally Hylton, supra note 27, at 36--38 (discussing hurdles such as identifYing 
the victims and defendants, causation, and statutes of limitation); Calvin Massey, Some 
Thoughts 011 the Law and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 157, 
161-65 (2004) (discussing hurdles related to the passage of time). 
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selecting defendants in reparations cases. V\There the state has con-
doned the wrong in the very document constituting it as a polity46 the 
state is rightly regarded as the principal target for suit.47 Thus, plain-
tiffs have resorted to a variety of constructive legal arguments in repa-
rations claims. 
The con trolling slavery reparations case is Cala v. United States, in 
which an African-Arnerican woman brought an action for damages 
against the United States government, alleging the kidnapping, en-
slavement, and transshipment of her ancestors, as well as continuing 
discrimination on the part of the government. 48 She also sought a 
court acknowledgment of the injustice of slavery and Jim Crow op-
pression, as well as an official apology from the United States gov-
ernment.49 The court dismissed the case, citing the government's fail-
ure to consent to suit under the Tucker Act, and the failure of the 
Thirteenth A.mendment to provide a remedy under the Administra-
tive Procedures Act.50 
More recently, the Court of Federal Claims in Obadele v. United 
States dismissed a slavery reparations claim filed under the Civil Liber-
ties Act, which provides for payments to Japanese-American internees 
detained during World War II.51 Plaintiffs argued that the Act rested 
upon an unconstitutional racial classification, and sought payment to 
descendants of slaves under the Act.52 The court upheld the Act's 
constitutionality while at the same time commenting that "the Plain-
tiffs have made a powerful case for redress as representatives of a ra-
cial group other than Americans of Japanese ancestry. "53 Clearly, Cata 
and Obadcle present mcyor obstacles for plaintiffs seeking reparations 
against the federal government. 
The currently filed slavery litigation lawsuits are grappling with 
these precedents.54 The distinctive feature of several of these suits is their 
46 Sec, e.g., V.S. CaNST, art. I, § 2, cI. 3 (three-fifths clause); V.S. CaNST. art. IV, § 2, cI. 
3 (fugitiw clause). 
47 Sec ROBINSON, supra note 44. at 204-08. 
48 70 F.3c! 1103, 11 06, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995). 
49 [d. 
50 [d. at 1111; sec Aclministrati"e Procedures Act, 5 V.S.C. § 702 (2000); Tucker Act, 28 
V.S.c. § 1491, 1505 (2000). 
51 Civil Liberties Act of 1988,50 V.S.c. app. §§ 1989-1989d (2000); Obadele Y. Vnited 
States, 52 Feci. Cl. 432, 444 (2002). 
52 Obadcle, 52 Fed. Cl. at 436. 
53 [d. at 442. 
54 See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, Alexander (No. 03-CV-133); Plaintiffs Com-
plaint and Jury Trk'll Demand, FarmelcPac1l7lla1111 (No. 02-c\'-1862); First Amended Complaint, 
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choice of defendants: corporations that participated in slavery in a vari-
ety of capacities. The issue is whether such suits present a sufficient basis 
for the courts to grant relief, or whether they will suffer the fate of Cato 
and Obadele. In his contribution to this symposium, Professor Hylton sug-
gests that, in casting around for a basis for suit, the slavery litigation suits 
have adopted a theory of litigation and of relief that inherently com-
promises their chance of success. 55 These suits, he argues, "aim [] for a 
significant redistribution of wealth," adopting "social welfare" as their 
underlying policy or goaI.56 These policy considerations are reflected not 
only in the relief sought and in the class of plaintiffs, but in the claims 
articulated: conspiracy; demand for accounting; human rights violations; 
conversion; and unjust enrichment.57 
And yet, while the problems faced by such lawsuits are well 
known and are the subject of many differences of opinion, there is 
merit in the various strategies employed by the wide variety of efforts 
to secure reparations.58 In terms of interest convergence, however, 
many people will view these commendable efforts as too far removed 
from present injustices to have much of an impact on the national 
consciousness. Arguably, no one in the white majority, and certainly 
not anyone in the power elite identified by Bell, feels the immediacy 
of slavery. Furthermore, the question of the appropriate response to-
ward the bitter history of slavery is a fraught one, even within the M-
rican-American community. Notably, there has been fairly widespread 
disagreement over not only the appropriate manner in which to me-
morialize slavery, but also over whether such a memorial should exist 
at all.59 Those who object to a slavery museum claim that such a me-
morial is either too painful or too stigmatizing for Mrican Americans 
even today.60 
Hurdle v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp. (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 10, 2002) (No. CGC-Q2-412388); 
see also Ogletree, Repai1ing the Past, supra note 4, at 298-308 (conunenting on these suits). 
55 Hylton, supra note 27, at 33-34. 
56 Id. at 33. 
57 See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint and Jury Trial Demand " 50-70, Farmer-Paellmann 
(No.02-CV-1862). 
58 See Ogletree, Repairing tlte Past, supm note 4, at 281. 
59 See, e.g., Jim Auchmutey, Slave Museums Confront a Painful Past, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONST., Mar. 9, 2003 (describing "the sensitive nature" of the topic of memorializing slav-
ery), available at 2003 vVL 13244321; Jacqueline Trescott, Capitol Site Favored for Black His-
tory Museum; Presidential Panel's Report Envisions 2011 Completion, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2003, 
(discussing "the long and often fractious history of deciding whether a museum dedicated 
to the African American story should be built on the [National) Mall [in Washington, 
D.C.) "), available at 2003 WL 17425494. 
60 See Auchmutey, supra note 59. 
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Such problems are magnified when the harms inflicted during 
slavery are used as a justification for redistributions of wealth and 
power, as efforts to secure legislative reparations indicate. The type of 
study that could make the case for that justification has been continu-
ally resisted at the federal level. In particular, Representative John 
Conyers' bill, H.R. 40, entitled "Commission to Study Reparation Pro-
posals for African Americans Act," has been defeated every year since 
its introduction in 1989.61 Given this general resistance to reparations, 
the challenge to look to tlle past to solve problems related to race re-
mains, and must not be ignored. For interest convergence to succeed, we 
must make a serious effort to confront past, and not simply present, in-
justices. 
Certainly, were the federal government to sponsor such a study, 
even if no payment would be included in the report's recommenda-
tions, it would provide an indication that the government wishes to 
take seriously the issue of reparations. The idea that the state should 
make an effort to investigate and acknowledges its responsibility has 
resulted in two major reparations successes: the Civil Liberties Act of 
1988,62 by which payments were made to World War II Japanese-
American internees; and the Rosewood Act,63 under which the state of 
Florida made payments to the survivors and descendants of the Rose-
wood Massacre of 1923. Thus, there is a good chance that a federal 
commission would provide a legal basis for suit to recover payments 
should a commission so recommend. That is certainly the basis for 
suit in tw'o recent holocaust reparations suits, and it is the case we are 
currently making in Oklahoma.64 
Nonetheless, while a federal commission would provide a neces-
sary legal basis for reparations lawsuits, it is not clear that the sort of 
commission proposed under H.R. 40 can overcome the failure of in-
61 See, e.g., Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act, H.R. 
40, 108th Congo (2003); H.R. 3745, 101st Congo (1989); see also Ogletree, Repairing the Past, 
supra note 4, at 281,290 (discussing Representative Conyers' introduction of this bilI each 
year for the last fourteen years). 
62 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989-1989b-9 (2000). 
63 Act of May 4, 1994, 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Servo ch. 94-359 (West) (relating to Rose-
wood, Florida) (codified in part at FLA. STAT. ch. 1004.60, 1009.55 (2003». 
64 See Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (s.n. Fla. 2002) (discussing 
Plaintiff's assertion that it was only after the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holo-
caust Assets released its report that they had the necessary facts for their complaint); Bod-
ner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp.2d 117, 123-24 (E.n.N.'\:: 2000) (discussing commis-
sions created by the French government to draft proposals for redress of Holocaust-era 
injuries); Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, 22, Alexander (No. 03-CV-133). 
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terest convergence. Even after the Riot Commission's report,65 the 
current reparations litigation in Oklahoma has been presented as a 
white-against-black struggle,66 with many white citizens opposed to 
reparations for the survivors of the Tulsa Race Riot. Private donations 
to reparations funds have dried up and local citizens have resented 
the intrusion by "national" lawyers in their local issues.67 
IV. JI1\1 CROW LITIGATION AS A FIRST STEP 
Compared to political activism, reparations advocacy through 
litigation may have greater potential to create interest convergence. 
As Professor Hylton and others have noted, the chances of successful 
litigation are greatly increased where the reparations claim can be 
framed as a traditional civil rights issue, allowing the courts to con-
centrate on statute of limitations problems rather than on creative 
theories of litigation.68 Two recent holocaust litigation cases suggest 
that, in circumstances similar to those presented in the Oklahoma 
litigation, there are, at the very least, grounds for tolling the statute of 
limitations.69 Given that the Oklahoma litigation does not seek to rely 
on a novel theory of injury, the statute of limitations issue is essentially 
the only bar to recovery.70 
The point of reparations advocacy through litigation, as opposed 
to reparations political activism, is to create convergence by changing 
the stakes of the debate. That is certainly what happened during the 
litigation leading up to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,71 and 
litigation success-indeed, perseverance-also changed the stakes in 
the Japanese-American internment debate. Once the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that the federal government had made a mate-
rial misrepresentation about the military exigency of its curfew and ex-
65 TULSA RACE RIOT, supra note 16. 
66 See Editorial, Double jeopardy: Suit Cites Statute of No Limitations, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, 
Feb. 28, 2003 (re-characterizing the 1921 Riot as a "racial war" that left both blacks and 
whites dead, and referring to reparationists as "professional race-baiters"), available at 2003 
\VL 13945084. 
67 See, Arnold Hamilton, '21 Tulsa Riot Case Polarizes: Some See Suit Emerging as Bellwether 
for Black Reparations Movement, DALLAS MORNING NEws,June 23, 2003, at lA. 
68 See Hylton, supm note 27, at 36-38; Anthony J. Sebok, HolV a New and Potentially Success-
ful Lawsuit Relating to a 1921 Race Riot in Tulsa }Hay Change the Debate over Reparations for .1frican-
.4mcricans, Mar. 10,2003, 'lI'lI 1-4, athttp://v,Tit.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20030310.html. 
69 See Rosner, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1204 (tolling statute of limitations for 58 years); Bodner, 
114 F. Supp. 2d at 121, 134-36 (tolling statute of limitations for over 50 years). 
70 See Sebok, supm note 68, 'lI' 22-27. 
71 347 U.S. 483 (1954); sec also Bell, Interest Convergence, supm note 7, at 20-24 (suggest-
ing the Court's opinion in Brown can best be understood by looking at its value to whites). 
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elusion policies of 1942, which it then hid for almost forty years, the 
statute of limitations was tolled and a suit was allowed to proceed in the 
mid-1980s. 72 It was that outcome that prompted the reparations pay-
ments under the Chil Liberties Act. 
The history of Brown demonstrates that incremental successes 
won on a divergent but related legal theory can result in convergence 
on the underlying goal of an initially unpopular legal strategy. Bmwn 
also demonstrates that such a strategy need not appeal to the m<yority 
of whites, but only those who have the power to change things. In 
other words, Bell is perhaps unduly pessimistic to suggest that: 
The in terest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be ac-
commodated only when it converges with the interests of 
whites .... [T]he Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, 
will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial 
equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the 
superior societal status of middle- and upper-class whites,73 
Thus, at the state level, the convergence of interests in the Oklahoma 
lawsuit may, in the short term, be limited to persuading the state to 
make changes to the Oklahoma educational system rather than pa)ing 
out large SlUTIS of money. Nonetheless, such short-term convergence 
may bear long-term fruit. A well-structured educational package offers 
an opportunity to teach about the manner in which interests converge, 
prO\iding a stepping stone to re-orient the public's perception about 
what people's interests are and where they converge. 
The benefit of Jim Crow reparations litigation is not simply the 
relative simplicity, as compared to sla"ery reparations suits, of stating a 
claim. The relative immediacy of the injury, symbolized by the pres-
ence of living survivors such as Otis Clark, underlines the recency of 
such acts of discrimination and ,iolent repression, demonstrating the 
persistent breadth and depth of racism in this country. Racism is 
broad in the sense that the virulent attacks on African Americans 
(and other minorities) have not been limited to a particular location. 
Many of us consider racial repression as a southern phenomenon, 
forgetting that all our towns, including New York, Boston, Chicago, 
Detroit, Omaha, Dallas, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, were segre-
gated on the basis of race. All of these towns have suffered race riots. 
72 See Hirabashi v. United States, 828 F,2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987), But see Hohri \" United 
States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984) (dismissing reparations claim on statute of limita-
tions grounds). 
73 Bell, Interest Convergence, sujJra note 7, at 22. 
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Most of these riots were perpetuated by white mobs attempting to sub-
jugate the black citizenry.74 In addition, all of these riots happened 
during this century. People who were there and who suffered are still 
alive. Some people who inflicted the suffering may still be alive. 75 
Racism is deep because of the extreme measures we take to deny 
its existence. The shame that frequently-and rightly-accompanies 
the identification of an individual as a racist does not always result 
from a disavowal of the underlying beliefs but from a recognition of 
the social sanctions that follow from such an identification. It is the 
attitude of white peers to the tag "racist" that is regarded as problem-
atic, not the failure properly to acknowledge the humanity of African 
Americans (or other minorities). As Bell notes, these attitudes have 
not disappeared, but resurface in white efforts to avoid integration.76 
Jim Crow reparations litigation forces the prevalence of segrega-
tionist practices upon the American public in all of its recency, its 
breadth, and its depth. It demands that the institutions that adopted 
these segregationist policies pay for them directly to identifiable vic-
tims or their children. If the reparations movement, at least in its Jim 
Crow aspect, has one benefit, it will be in giving the lie to the sugges-
tion of Adm'and Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 77 and Cit)' of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson CO.7S that discrimination is a thing of the past, and in tracing 
the identifiable legal and social effects of slavery and segregation in 
current society.79 Furthermore, by providing a federal forum for real 
74 See Claudia Kolker, A. Pailljiti Present as Historians Confront a Nation's Bloody Past, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2213090; Nicholas Von Hoffman, U.S. Histo,~v, 
U.S. Riots: A Thread of Mob Violence, Civil Unrest, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1992, available at 1992 
WL 2914207. 
75 Graphic evidence of this history of violence, often sponsored by states and munici-
palities, has been collected in photographs in WITHOUT SANCTUARY (james Allen ed., 
2000), a memorial to the victims of lynching throughout the nation. },Iany of the photos 
can be viewed online at the '~Tithout Sanctuary Musarium, http:/ j\'Mw.musarium.com/ 
withoutsanctuary/main.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003). These trophy pictures were circu-
lated as souvenirs of the lynchings they depict. A similar photograph, entitled "Running 
the Negro out of Tulsa" is depicted in Professor Brophy's excellent book, RECONSTRUCT-
ING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921, supra note 22, and in the Greenwood Cul-
tural Center's Riot Museum in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The Greenwood Center also maintains 
an online museum of the Tulsa Race Riot at http://w\\w.greenwoodculturalcenter.com/ 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2003). 
76 Bell, Interest Convergence, supra note 7, at 20-24. 
77 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
78 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
79 See Spencer Overton, Racial Disparities and the Political Function of Property, 49 UCLA 
L. REV. 1553, 1558-59, 1568-70 (2002). Professor Overton states that mandatory segrega-
tion policies in education, employment, housing, and business increased the inequality in 
the control of resources between white Americans and black Americans. !d. at 1558-59. 
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people to share their experiences in a way that forces the larger pub-
lic to recognize their humanity, Jim Crow reparations litigation un-
dermines the denial surrounding anti-African-American racism. Em-
pathy, which sustains us as reparations adYocates, is, on this yiew, one 
step towards manifesting in terest com'ergence. so 
CONCLUSION 
Several signs of interest in Jim Crow reparations, if not in conYer-
gence, are forthcoming. The recent academic endorsement of Jim 
Crow lawsuits is an indication of changing attitudes on the topic in the 
twenty-first century.Sl This is especially so as the academy isjust the type 
of elite audience that has generally proyed resistant to reparations ex-
cept in limited circumstances. A judicial endorsement of Jim Crow liti-
gation would be eyen more gratii)'ing, particularly for the victims and 
descendants of the Tulsa Race Riot. A legal victory, even if only on the 
statute of limitations issue, has obvious value as precedent for other 
cases that could be filed around the coun try. 
Nevertheless, as I have argued elsewhere, the rejection of slavery 
reparations is a little too convenient.s2 It permits us to forget that 
many of the founding fathers were slave-holders and racists who, over 
the objections of their colleagues, ensured that the Constitution 
reflected the \iews of slave-holders and not those of abolitionists.s3 
Nowadays, Americans prefer to consider the Civil War as fought by the 
foes of slavery rather than by anti-secessionists, many of whom were 
pro-slavery (or at least ambivalen t about its suppression), and ignore 
the fact that the Emancipation Proclamation preserved slavery in 
those states loyal to the North. Perhaps most concerning, the rejec-
tion of slavery reparations allows us to forget or deny that slavery im-
posed a holocaust that resulted in the extermination of millions of 
Mricans through transshipment alone-individuals who were tossed 
overboard as ballast or spoiled cargo as needs required. 
Furthermore, he asserts that wealth disparities that stem from past segregation reduce the 
ability of significant numbers of people of color to participate in democracy by making 
campaign contributions, purchasing airtime and billboards, and retaining lobbying assis-
tance. /d. at 1568-70. 
80 On empathy or "intimacy" as a goal of the reparations mm'ement, sec Eric J. l\[iIIer, 
Reconceiving Rcpamtiolls: Multi/Jle Strategies in tlte Reparations Debate. 24 B.C. TIIIRD WORLD 
LJ. 45, 78-79 (2004). 
81 See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 68. 
82 See Ogletree, Repairing tlte Past, sU/Jr{l note 4, at 308-19. 
83 See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board Of Education: Forty-Five Years After The Fact, 2601110 
N.V. L. REV. 171, 175 (2000). 
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Thus, while Jim Crow lawsuits are a good beginning, reparations 
lawsuits must not stop at compensation alone. Some more general 
form of redistributive justice should be contemplated. Professor Hyl-
ton is opposed to this type of redistributive lawsuit, arguing that 
throwing money at the problem has not worked thus far. 84 Nonethe-
less, Hylton's case against wealth-redistribution, while interesting, is 
unproyen because it fails to take into account a variety of factors that 
might impede wealth distribution as a cure for the ills inflicted by ra-
cism and segregation. Wealth-redistribution is an important goal for 
reparations, although (in the manner discussed by Hylton) that may 
be some way down the road. 
In addition to wealth redistribution, the m~or goal of repara-
tions litigation, one that is generally underemphasized, is knowledge 
redistribution. Knowledge redistribution engenders the empathy that 
may foster interest convergence; it also publicizes the voices of the 
alienated African Americans willing to endorse the likes of such out-
siders as AI Sharpton in his run for President of the United States. 
These outsider voices must not only be represented but also ad-
dressed for the sake of whites as well as African Americans. The turn 
to nationalism and separationism under a politics of confrontation85 
promises to create a racial powder keg of disenfranchised African 
Americans who haye little to lose by engaging in desperate acts of pro-
test. Yet the reparations movement has a long way to go before it per-
suades white elites that the sort of redistribution contemplated is a 
good thing. For the sake of all American citizens, let us hope we suc-
ceed sooner rather than later. 
84 See Hylton, supra note 27, at 34-36. 
85 See Miller, supra note 80, at 48-56. 
